Adukkhamasukhīsutta

Sāvatthinidānaṁ. “Kismiṁ nu kho, bhikkhave, sati, kiṁ upādāya, kiṁ abhinivissa evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘adukkhamasukhī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā’”ti? “Bhagavaṁmūlakā no, bhante, dhammā …pe….

At Sāvatthī. “Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does the view arise: ‘The self is neither happy nor suffering, and healthy after death’?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

“Rūpe kho, bhikkhave, sati, rūpaṁ upādāya, rūpaṁ abhinivissa evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘adukkhamasukhī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā’”ti. “Vedanāya sati …pe… saññāya sati … saṅkhāresu sati … viññāṇe sati, viññāṇaṁ upādāya, viññāṇaṁ abhinivissa evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘adukkhamasukhī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā’ti.

“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, the view arises: ‘The self is neither happy nor suffering, and is healthy after death.’ When feeling … perception … choices … consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, the view arises: ‘The self is neither happy nor suffering, and healthy after death.’

Taṁ kiṁ maññatha, bhikkhave, rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti? “Aniccaṁ, bhante” …pe… vipariṇāmadhammaṁ, api nu taṁ anupādāya evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjeyya: ‘adukkhamasukhī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā’”ti? “No hetaṁ, bhante”. “Iti kho, bhikkhave, yadaniccaṁ taṁ dukkhaṁ. Tasmiṁ sati, tadupādāya evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘adukkhamasukhī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā’”ti. “Vedanā …pe… saññā … saṅkhārā … viññāṇaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti? “Aniccaṁ, bhante” …pe… vipariṇāmadhammaṁ, api nu taṁ anupādāya evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjeyya: ‘adukkhamasukhī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā’”ti? “No hetaṁ, bhante”. “Iti kho, bhikkhave, yadaniccaṁ taṁ dukkhaṁ. Tasmiṁ sati, tadupādāya evaṁ diṭṭhi uppajjati: ‘adukkhamasukhī attā hoti arogo paraṁ maraṇā’”ti. Chabbīsatimaṁ. Tatiyapeyyālo.

What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “And so, what’s impermanent is suffering. When this exists, grasping at this, the view arises: ‘The self is neither happy nor suffering, and is healthy after death.’ Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would such a view arise?” “No, sir.” “And so, what’s impermanent is suffering. When this exists, grasping at this, the view arises: ‘The self is neither happy nor suffering, and healthy after death.’”